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DIRECT RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
most of his income, while Sniadach goes directly to the heart of the prob-
lem by requiring that a hearing precede garnishment. The degree of
protection Sniadachl will ultimately provide depends upon the administra-
tive techniques the states choose to implement it, while the CCPA's
mandate cannot be avoided.
CLINTON EUDY, JR.
Real Property-Direct Restraints on Alienation
Owners who dispose of property frequently attempt to attach restric-
tions on its further sale or disposition. In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
John Thomasson Construction Co.,' a case recently before the North
Carolina Supreme Court, property had been conveyed in trust for the
use of Alexander Children's Home, a non-profit charitable corporation,
with the provision that the trustees should have no power to sell or con-
vey it. The court upheld this restriction against sale by saying in part
that it would be a strange deviation to permit creation of perpetual
charitable trusts while preventing the donor from restraining the sale
of the trust corpus. Since direct restraints on alienation are normally
void, and this decision reversed the court of appeals and overturned
strong dicta which had earlier been generally accepted as indicating such
restraints would be void in North Carolina,2 the decision suggests a re-
view of the case law concerning direct restraints on alienation.3
Direct restraints, as discussed in this note, are terms incorporated
in the devise or grant that would preclude or limit alienation or set up
penalties for attempts to alienate. If the restraint is phrased so that the
power to alienate is withheld or limited, as was the case in Thomasson,
it is termed a disabling restraint. If the restraint calls for forfeiture of
the interest to a third party or for reversion back to the grantor when the
prohibition is violated, it is, quite naturally, termed a forfeiture re-
straint.4 As will be seen, forfeiture restraints are sometimes valid where
a similar disabling restraint is void.
-275 N.C. 399, 168 S.E.2d 358 (1969).
'Hass v. Hass, 195 N.C. 734, 741, 143 S.E. 541, 544 (1928).
'See generally 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY pt. 26 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952)
[hereinafter cited as A.L.P.]; J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROP-
ERTY (2d ed. 1895) [hereinafter cited as GRAY]; 6 R. POWELL, THE LAw OF REAL
PROPERTY §§ 839-48 (recomp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as POWELL] ; IV RESTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY §§ 404-38 (1944) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; L.
SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1111-71 (2d ed. 1956)
[hereinafter cited as SIMES & SMITH].
'6 A.L.P. § 26.1.
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LEGAL ESTATES
Fee Simple
If a devise or grant is expressed in terms serving to pass a legal fee
simple, the courts normally will void any attempt to attach restrictions
to the fee that would deny or limit the taker's right to alienate. In the
early case of Monroe v. Hall,5 land and slaves were conveyed "provided
always, that neither [of the grantees] shall sell or dispose of any part
of the above named land and negroes in any manner whatsoever."0 The
court held that such a proviso was "repugnant to the fee simple estate...
and is therefore simply void."' Similar decisions have been reached on all
attempts at absolute preclusion of sale of a fee simple,' even those in which
the restraint is imposed for a limited time.' In Latimer v. Waddell"0 the
grantor retained a life estate for himself and directed that the remainder-
men not dispose of their interest during the grantor's life or for five
years thereafter. The court held that a condition annexed to a conveyance
in fee simple preventing alienation of an estate by the grantee within a
certain period of time was void.
Where an attempt is made to limit the manner in which alienation
of a fee may be made, the restraint is also void. Thus, if the grantor
attempts to exempt the property from involuntary alienation to satisfy
the claims of creditors of the grantee, the attempt is void.:" Similarly,
provisions dictating who will take upon death of the grantee are void if
the words preceding the provision conveyed a fee simple.1 2 The case of
597 N.C. 206, 1 S.E. 651 (1887).
6 Id. at 207, 1 S.E. at 652.
7 Id. at 210, 1 S.E. at 653.
'Murdock v. Deal, 208 N.C. 754, 182 S.E. 466 (1935); Short v. Gurley, 172
N.C. 866, 90 S.E. 891 (1916).
' Restraint for a specified period: Johnson v. Gaines, 230 N.C. 653, 55 S.E.2d
191 (1949) (thirty-five years after testator's death); Douglas v. Stevens, 214
N.C. 688, 200 S.E. 366 (1939) (forfeiture if sold within fifty years); Williams v.
Sealy, 201 N.C. 372, 160 S.E. 452 (1931) (fifty years). Restraint for lifetime:
Buckner v. Hawkins, 230 N.C. 99, 52 S.E.2d 16 (1949); Welch v. Murdock, 192
N.C. 709, 135 S.E. 611 (1926) ; Combs v. Paul, 191 N.C. 789, 133 S.E. 97 (1926);
Pilley v. Sullivan, 182 N.C. 493, 109 S.E. 359 (1921); Holloway v. Green, 167
N.C. 91, 83 S.E. 243 (1914); Foster v. Lee, 150 N.C. 688, 64 S.E. 761 (1909);
Pritchard v. Bailey, 113 N.C. 521, 18 S.E. 668 (1893). Restraint until a certain
age is reached: American Trust Co. v. Nicholson, 162 N.C. 257, 78 S.E. 152
(1913) (until youngest child was twenty-one); Twitty v. Camp, 62 N.C. 61
(1866) (until age thirty-five reached).
'o 119 N.C. 370, 26 S.E. 122 (1896).
"1Vaughan v. Wise, 152 N.C. 31, 67 S.E. 33 (1910) ; Ricks v. Pope, 129 N.C.
52, 39 S.E. 638 (1901).
" Croom v. Cornelius, 219 N.C. 761, 14 S.E.2d 799 (1941); Hambright v.
Carroll, 204 N.C. 496, 168 S.E. 817 (1933); Daniel v. Bass, 193 N.C. 294, 136
S.E. 733 (1927); Carroll v. Herring, 180 N.C. 369, 104 S.E. 892 (1920).
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Newland v. Newland 3 aptly illustrate how a testator attempting to satisfy
two desires violated this rule. In attempting to provide for his wife, the
testator devised property to her to "have and hold and [dispose] of at
her own discretion while she lives."' 4 Then, in order to keep the property
within the family, he added, "and at her death, so as not to be disposed
of out of the family."' 5 The court held that the first clause, giving an
absolute power of disposal, was the equivalent of conveying the fee and
that any subsequent restraints were therefore void. Problems such as this
one may often be avoided, and the desires of the grantor fulfilled, by care-
ful wording of the grant so as to convey a life estate with limited powers of
disposition or appointment or a defeasible fee with a limitation over."e
Faced with a statutory admonition to construe devises or grants as pass-
ing a fee simple whenever possible,17 North Carolina courts require clear
and technically correct wording to create any lesser estate.' While this
situation apparently often leads to a court interpretation that does not
precisely reflect the intent of the grantor, 9 it does further the policy of
ensuring maximum alienability. 20
It is a general rule that restrictions that would preclude sale without
prior approval, or without giving the grantor or some third party an op-
portunity to repurchase, are void.2' Following the decision in Hardy
Brothers v. Galloway,22 it appears that the North Carolina court also takes
' 46 N.C. 463 (1854).
l& Id.
1 Id.10See generally 6 A.L.P. § 26.47, and cases cited therein. In Foster v. Lee, 150
N.C. 688, 64 S.E. 761 (1909), the testator willed land to his daughter in fee and
added the condition that she should not dispose of it, but that it should descend
to her children; and the court held the restraint void. By wording the device
so as to give a life estate to the daughter with remainder to her children, it would
appear that the testator could have effectively achieved his purpose.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-1 (1966).
"See Taylor v. Taylor, 228 N.C. 275, 45 S.E.2d 368 (1947); Holloway v.
Green, 167 N.C. 91, 83 S.E. 243 (1914). But cf. Hampton v. West, 212 N.C. 315,
193 S.E. 290 (1937); Bryan v. Dunn, 120 N.C. 36, 27 S.E. 37 (1897) (dictum);
Hall v. Robinson, 56 N.C. 348 (1857) (dictum).
"' The intent of the grantor is uniformly stated to be the primary object of
consideration in the interpretation of grants and wills. See, e.g., Carroll v. Her-
ring, 180 N.C. 369, 104 S.E. 892 (1920); Newland v. Newland, 46 N.C. 463
(1854).
"See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 228 N.C. 275, 45 S.E.2d 368 (1947); Hambright
v. Carroll, 204 N.C. 496, 168 S.E. 817 (1933); Foster v. Lee, 150 N.C. 688, 64
S.E. 761 (1909)." 6 POWELL § 842 n.11; RESTATEMENT § 406, comment h at 2404.
111 N.C. 519, 15 S.E. 890 (1892). The deed involved in this case purported
to retain for the grantors the right to repurchase the land whenever sold and to
render void the deed if the grantee attempted to convey or mortgage without giv-
1969l
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this position although the court had some difficulty in reaching such a
result. There have been some convincing arguments given by the com-
mentators that this is an area of restraints in which the courts should
avoid an arbitrary declaration of invalidity and instead look at the utility
of the restraint to uphold those serving a valid interest.2 The Illinois
Supreme Court has recently recognized this argument by enforcing
reconveyance to a cooperative housing association when deeds had been
given to association members to enable them to obtain mortgages.24 There
is some doubt that the decision in Hardy Brothers would be binding
precedent to void such a restraint in North Carolina if it were worded in
terms of a first-refusal option at ascertainable terms.25 Indeed, the de-
cision in Hardy Brothers may be read as lending support to the validity
of this type term since the court treated the provision for repurchase as -a
restraint on alienation only after declaring it to be void as a contract to
reconvey because of the uncertainty of the terms.2 6
For one reason or another attempts are often made to limit the persons
to whom alienation is permitted, either by specification of a small group
to whom alienation is allowed or by the exclusion of certain groups.
Attempts to exclude all but a small group most often occur when the
grantor wishes to have property retained within the family. This situa-
tion occurs in Langston v. Wooten,27 where the testator directed that
land be divided among his children and that they should have the right
to sell it only to each other. The court held that attempted restraints
permitting alienation among only a limited group are void. 28 Although
there are no cases specifically on the point in North Carolina, many
ing the grantors the privilege of repurchasing. The court held that the provision
was too uncertain to be effective as either a conditional sale or a contract to re-
convey since it was for an unlimited time and no terms were fixed; and since the
deed had already recited words passing the fee simple, it was void as a restraint
if considered a condition subsequent.
"See, e.g., 6 A.L.P. § 26.29.
2 Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, 21 Ill. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30
(1960), noted in 14 VAND. L. REv. 1535 (1961).
" See P. RoHrAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOmINiUM LAW AND PRiAcTICF § 10.03[1]
(1968).
"The courts have no difficulty in upholding options Which in effect preclude
alienation to all except the optionee until he has had an opportunity to refuse to
purchase, and they are seemingly unconcerned with the restraint aspect when it is
a contract right. Pure Oil Co. v. Baars, 224 N.C. 612, 31 S.E.2d 854 (1944);
Chadwick v. Blades, 210 N.C. 609, 188 S.E. 198 (1936).
2'232 N.C. 124, 59 S.E.2d 605 (1950).
"8Accord, Early v. Tayloe, 219 N.C. 363, 13 S.E.2d 609 (1941); Williams
v. McPherson, 216 N.C. 565, 5 S.E.2d 830 (1939); Norwood v. Crowder, 177
N.C. 469, 99 S.E. 345 (1919) ; Brooks v. Griffen, 177 N.C. 7, 97 S.E. 730 (1919).
[Vol. 48
DIRECT RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
writers have expressed the view that restraints specifically excluding
one person or a limited few from purchasing may be valid.29 It can be
inferred from the court's approval, prior to the decision in Shelley v.
Kramer3 of covenants restricting alienation to racial and social groups81
that this view is accepted in North Carolina.
Life Estates
The courts have been more willing to tolerate restrictions on the
alienation of life estates, primarily due to the presence of a third party
who has a very legitimate interest in how the property in question will be
maintained and preserved and hence an interest in who possesses the life
estate. 2 Where the restraints are disabling, however, the courts refuse to
allow them to stand.3 3 Disabling restraints would often permit continued
enjoyment of the estate by the life tenant while he refused payment to
creditors with legitimate claims, a situation that obviously offends the
court's sense of fairness. When the restraint is a valid forfeiture over
for attempted alienation, it should be upheld since continued denial of
creditors is no longer a factor. There is much support for this view in
dicta in the North Carolina cases"' although the court has never spe-
cifically decided the point. In Mizell v. Bazemore, 5 a life estate was given
with the provision that if any creditors of the life tenant should seek to
subject the land to payment of his debts, the life estate would end and
the remainderman take at that instant. But it also was provided that
the life tenant would continue to have the use of the lands for life with
no rent. The court said that there was in fact no limitation over because
of the continued use by the life tenant and declared the restraint void since
it was disabling in fact, if not in form."
Estate for Years
A term in a lease that would preclude or limit the alienation of the
lessee's interest by assignment or subleasing is valid if it results in a
2' 6 A.L.P. § 26.33; GRAY §§ 40-44; 6 POWELL § 843; RESTATEMENT § 406, com-
ment '.
fo 334 U.S. 1 (1948), zoted in 27 N.C.L. REv. 224 (1949).
'Vernon v. R.J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N.C. 58, 36 S.E.2d 710 (1946).
See Phillips v. Wearn, 226 N.C. 290, 37 S.E.2d 895 (1946).
" See 6 A.L.P. § 26.48.
"Beam v. Gilkey, 225 N.C. 520, 35 S.E.2d 641 (1945) ; Stokes v. Dixon, 182
N.C. 323, 108 S.E. 913 (1921) ; Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916).
"See Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916) ; Bryan v. Dunn, 120
N.C. 36, 27 S.E. 37 (1897) ; Pace v. Pace, 73 N.C. 119 (1875).
"194 N.C. 324, 139 S.E. 453 (1927).
"Id. at 327, 139 S.E. at 454.
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forfeiture or termination of the lease.87 There is some disagreement
among the writers as to the validity of disabling restraints on leases 88
and the point apparently has not been decided in North Carolina. Draw-
ing an analogy to life estates, where there is the same balancing of the
interest of the fee holder as to who occupies against the desire for free-
dom of alienation, it would seem that disabling restraints in leases are
void. As a practical matter, the point is not likely to arise since restric-
tions in leases are nearly always worded so as to give a right of re-entry
or termination to the lessor upon breach by the lessee.
The courts, while accepting restrictions in leases, have confined them
as closely as possible by declaring waivers of the restraints wherever
possible39 and by strictly construing any restraints within the technical
meaning of the language used.4 ° A clause precluding subleasing will not
prevent assignment41 and a clause precluding assignment will not prevent
subleasing.42 As leases are used more and more in strictly commercial
transactions, it would seem that where the lessor does not intend to per-
sonally re-occupy, the courts could take a stricter view and void re-
straints extending for long periods of time and not essential to the pro-
tection of the lessor. Such a rule would be hard to apply, however, and
the courts have not indicated any trend in this direction.
Rights of Partition of Concurrent Estates48
Restrictions are often used that require tenants in common to occupy
property while specifying that there will be no partition. Such re-
straints are often determined by the courts to serve a valid and worth-
while purpose, such as maintenance of a home until the youngest child is
of age; and where they are limited in time, the courts generally accept
"' Carson v. Imperial '400' National, Inc., 267 N.C. 229, 147 S.E.2d 898
(1966); Rogers v. Hall, 227 N.C. 363, 42 S.E.2d 347 (1947); Hargrave v. King,
40 N.C. 430 (1848).
"8 Compare GRAY § 278 and RESTATEMENT § 410 with A.L.P. § 26.51.
"9 Fairchild Realty Co. v. Spiegel, Inc., 246 N.C. 458, 98 S.E.2d 871 (1957),
where a lessor was held to have waived the right to declare forfeiture for assign-
ment by continuing to accept rent from the original lessee after an assignment had
been made even though he refused to accept rent from the assignee and notified
the lessee that he did not consent to the assignment.
,o Rogers v. Hall, 227 N.C. 363, 42 S.E.2d 347 (1947).
'1 Id.
J . D. Cornell Millinery Co. v. Little-Long Co., 197 N.C. 168, 148 S.E. 26
(1929).
"' Technically speaking, partition is not a form of alienation. The practical
effect, however, of prohibiting partition is so much like a restraint on alienation
that they are usually considered together.
(Vol. 48
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them. 4 However, where partition is perpetually or unreasonably re-
strained, the restraint is void.
45
The North Carolina court's treatment of these attempts may be seen
by considering three cases. In Anderson v. Edwards,46 the court, taking
notice of an outstanding ten-year farm mortgage and other factors, up-
held a provision that there should be no partition of the farm for ten years
although this restraint also essentially precluded alienation for that
period. In Mangum v. Wilson,47 the court held that a direction by the
testator that property devised to his five children should "stand as it is
altogether,"4  with no limit as to time, was void if considered a restraint
on either alienation or partition even though the children could sell parts
of the property by mutual agreement under the terms of the will. Ameri-
can Trust Co. v. Nicholson49 involved a provision in a will that the prop-
erty devised should not be partitioned or sold until the youngest child
reached the age of twenty-one. The court in this case, while recognizing
the valid purpose of the restraints, in a decision consistent with the ac-
cepted rules held that the property could be sold since the attempted re-
straint on alienation was void. But the court effectively enforced the re-
straint on partition by upholding the lower court's order that the proceeds
of the sale be re-invested in other property to be held in common by the
beneficiaries. 9
In condominiums restraints on partition actions are essential because
the occupants rely on free access to common area stairs, halls, and entry
ways. The North Carolina Unit Housing Act, in recognition of this need,
makes a specific statutory exception to the judicial rules against restraints
by declaring that common areas of condominiums may not be partitioned
or divided and that any covenant to do so is void.5'
Future Interests
The North Carolina cases on restraints on future interests appear to
follow the rule expressed in the Restatement of Property that a restraint
"Greene v. Stadiem, 198 N.C. 445, 152 S.E. 398 (1930) ; EX parte Watts, 130
N.C. 237, 41 S.E. 289 (1902); cases cited notes 45-47 infra.
"Mangum v. Wilson, 235 N.C. 353, 70 S.E.2d 19 (1952) ; Pardue v. Givens,
54 N.C. 306 (1854).
'°239 N.C. 510, 80 S.E.2d 260 (1954).
'235 N.C. 353, 70 S.E.2d 19 (1952).
,8 Id. at 356, 70 S.E.2d at 20.
" 162 N.C. 257, 78 S.E. 152 (1913). Although this case involved a trust,
which made the court's decision easier to implement, the comparison is valid.
Id. at 262, 78 S.E. at 155."N.C. GEx. STAT. § 47A-7 (1966).
19691
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on future interests will be valid only if a similar restraint on a legal pos-
sessory estate of the same duration would be valid. 2 There has been no
express indorsement of this rule by the court; however, previous decisions




The general rule in North Carolina seems to be that restraints against
alienation of equitable interests in private trusts are treated the same as
legal interests. That is, if the beneficiary has the equitable interest that
would enable him to claim, by right, the property or income therefrom,
he is treated as the legal owner and is entitled to the common law power of
alienation of his interest, and the property is subject to actions by his
creditors." In Pace v. Pace,56 property was placed in trust with the re-
striction that none of it should be subject to the disposal or debts of the
grantees; the court, holding the restraint void, said that "by no form of
words, can property be given to a man, or to another in trust for him, so
that he shall not have a right to dispose of his estate in it .... ,,17 To the
same effect is the statement in Lee v. Oates.P that "this court has for many
years consistently held that the doctrine as to restraints on alienation ap-
plies . . . to equitable estates as well as to legal estates.""0
However, there are instances in which property held in trust cannot
be reached either by the beneficiary or his creditors, as where the interest
will not vest until the happening of a certain event,"0 where there is a
52 RESTATEMENT § 411.
"' Restraints were held void in: Johnson v. Gaines, 230 N.C. 653, 55 S.E.2d
191 (1949) (remainder after life estate not to be sold for thirty-five years);
Douglass v. Stevens, 214 N.C. 688, 200 S.E. 366 (1939) (same, for fifty years);
Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N.C. 460, 48 S.E. 785 (1904) (life estate and remainder
not to be sold during tenant's life). SIMES & SMIT11 § 1159 n.79 cites Latimer v.
Waddell, 119 N.C. 370, 26 S.E. 122 (1896) (remainder not to be sold during life
estate or for five years thereafter held void) and Pardue v. Givens, 54 N.C. 306
(1854) (remainder in fee never to be sold held void).
See generally Christopher, Spendthrift and Other Restraints in Trusts:
North Carolina, 41 N.C.L. REv. 49 (1962).
"' Bank of Union v. Heath, 187 N.C. 54, 121 S.E. 24 (1924) ; Smith v. Witter,
174 N.C. 616, 94 S.E. 402 (1917); American Trust Co. v. Nicholson, 162 N.C.
257, 78 S.E. 152 (1913) ; Christmas v. Winston, 152 N.C. 48, 67 S.E. 58 (1910) ;
Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N.C. 460, 48 S.E. 785 (1904); Mebane v. Mebane, 39
N.C. 131 (1845); Dick v. Pitchford, 21 N.C. 480 (1837).
S73 N.C. 119 (1875).
r Id. at 125.
6" 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916).
rId. at 721, 88 S.E. at 891.6 0Ashe v. Hale, 40 N.C. 55 (1847) (property in trust for the use of W to vest
[Vol, 48
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valid restriction on partition or division of the property, 1 or where
there are contingent trust interests outstanding that may affect the bene-
ficiary's share.0 2 By analogy to legal life estates and the cases cited in
note 34 supra, it would appear that forfeiture restraints on an equitable
life estate or estate for years would be valid, and this reasoning is borne
out by dicta in several cases."3
Despite the absolute terms used in Pace and Lee, North Carolina pro-
vides a very limited exception to the general rule by a statute0 4 permitting
spendthrift trusts for the support and maintenance of certain relations
of the settlor with maximum annual incomes of five hundred dollars at
the time established. The courts require strict compliance with the terms
of the statute in order for the settlor to establish a spendthrift trust ;65 but
once it is established, there is a disabling restraint in effect: The bene-
ficiary may not alienate his interest by voluntary action, and it cannot be
reached by action of his creditors. 6' The trustee is to disburse the money
as required for the support of the grantee and may not pay the money
directly to himY As would be expected, a settlor may-not put property in
trust for his own support under this statute. s Spendthrift trusts have re-
ceived much more lenient treatment in other jurisdictions; indeed, a ma-
jority of the states' courts accepted them without legislation. 9
in H only when H was free of debt); Bank of the State v. Forney, 37 N.C. 181
(1842) (devise to executors to hold property until testator's sons were out of debt
and then to divide the estate). See also Green v. Green, 86 N.C. 546 (1882).
1 Hill v. Jones, 123 N.C. 201, 31 S.E. 474 (1898) ; Blake v. Blake, 118 N.C.
575, 24 S.E. 424 (1896). In both of these cases there was a provision in the trust
instrument that the property was not to be partitioned or divided until the youngest
beneficiary was of age, and the court refused to order partition either for the
parties or for their creditors.
" Dick v. Pitchford, 21 N.C. 480 (1837). Here the cestui qui trust was per-
mitted to assign his interest, but the assignee could not get possession since the
property was still subject to the trust and the contingent interests created thereby.
"Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916); Pace v. Pace, 73 N.C.
119 (1875); Bank of the State v. Forney, 37 N.C. 181 (1842).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-9 (1966). See Stephenson, The North Carolina Spend-
thrift Trust Statute, 31 N.C.L. REv. 175 (1953) for recommendations on changing
the statute.
"See, e.g., Vaughan v. Wise, 152 N.C. 31, 67 S.E. 33 (1910), in which the
court stated that the statute is to be strictly construed and Gray v. Hawkins, 133
N.C. 1, 45 S.E. 363 (1903), in which the will specifically stated that its purpose
was to establish a trust under the provisions of the statute, but the court dis-
allowed the trust on technicalities.
" Chinnis v. Cobb, 210 N.C. 104, 185 S.E. 638 (1936) ; Fowler v. Webster,
173 N.C. 442, 92 S.E. 157 (1917).
" Fowler v. Webster, 173 N.C. 442, 92 S.E. 157 (1917).
" Pilkington v. West, 246 N.C. 575, 99 S.E.2d 798 (1957); GRAy §§ 90-99.
60 6 A.L.P. §§ 26.94-.95.
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Public Charitable Trusts
The courts have quite naturally sought to validate gifts to charity and
this fact has had an effect on the treatment of restraints on alienation at-
tached to such gifts. Aided by an early recognition that it was in the
public interest for charities to be allowed perpetual existence, the ma-
jority of jurisdictions in the United States have decided that the donor
should be permitted to restrict the use of his gift to the one purpose
that he wished to benefit. Restraints on alienation in support of that
desire have been upheld"° in these states. With the decision in Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. John Thowasson Construction Co.,71 North Caro-
lina also has clearly adopted this position and will permit grantors to for-
bid sale or disposition of property by the trustee holding for a public
charity.
It does not appear, however, that acceptance of the restraints will
have any great effect on the way that courts will decide cases in which a
trustee is seeking to obtain court approval of a sale of trust property.
Even without valid restraints, sales will normally only be approved when
they are required to affect the intent of the settlor or to preserve the
trust ;72 and when there are restraints, the court may still authorize a sale
if the circumstances warrant it.73
CONCLUSION
While it is acknowledged that restraints on alienation of property
sometime serve a valid purpose, they quite often reflect only the grantor's
personal whims or doubts about the future. In Brooks v. Griffin 74 the
judicial attitude toward restraints on alienation was expressed as follows:
It is a singular commentary upon human nature that, knowing the
difficulty of managing to the best advantage one's own estate while
living, with full knowledge of changing conditions, that any man should
wish, or think himself competent, to restrict by deed or will the con-
trol of property in the hands of a grantee or devisee after the grantor
shall have passed hence. No one can foresee the changing conditions
which may arise and which will require a change in the investment or
o70 CJ.S. Perpetuities § 68 (1951); Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 1208 (1965).
71275 N.C. 399, 168 S.E.2d 358 (1969).
7"But see id. at 409, 168 S.E.2d at 365 (concurring opinion), where it is sug-
gested that different criteria be used when there is a term of restraint in the trust
instrument.
7 Id. at 408, 168 S.E.2d at 364 and cases cited therein.
7" 177 N.C. 7, 97 S.E. 730 (1919).
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in the management of property in the always uncertain future....
It is the vanity of human nature that one out of whose hands property
is passing should seek to control it after it has ceased to be his.75
DONALD W. HARPER
Trade Regulation-Price Discrimination under Section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act
In the recent case of Perkins v. Standard Oil Co.,1 the United States
Supreme Court examined an aspect of section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman ActY to which it had never before affixed a decisive interpreta-
tion. The Court considered the issue of whether the protection afforded
by section 2(a) extends to competitors on the fourth, and by necessity,
the third functional level. The narrow questions presented by the Perkins
decision are whether that section logically dictated the Court's holding
and what the possible ramifications of the decision may be.
The Robinson-Patman Act' was born of a Depression fear that the
small-scale merchant was on the verge of obliteration by the newly-arisen
chain-store giants. Section 2 of the original Clayton Act of 19144 had
'1 Id. at 9-10, 97 S.E. at 732.
1395 U.S. 642 (1969).
215 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964), which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ...
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered: . . . And pro-
vided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes
from time to time where in response to changing conditions affecting the
market ....
15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964).
'The previous section 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) read in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities . . . where the effect of such
discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce: Provided, That nothing herein contained
shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of commodities on
account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity
sold, or that makes only due allowance for differences in the cost of selling
1969]
